It’s been more than a decade since I published a report on, and analysis of the capsize of the yacht Báden at launch by Northern Marine in Anacortes, WA in 2014. The fact is protocols to prevent a recurrence of that kind of mishap are not only well-known, but within the control of just about every yacht builder in the world. Yet, the recent capsize at launch of the Turkish-built yacht, Dolce Vento, is almost eerily reminiscent of the Báden mishap in 2014.
Peter Swanson, editor and publisher of Loose Cannon here on Substack, was my editor at Passagemaker, when I originally wrote the Báden piece for that magazine. At the time, Peter ruffled more than a few feathers because the facts of the case did not reflect well on the state of the yacht building industry. And most special-interest consumer magazines avoided publishing pieces that could potentially harm their relations with advertisers or the umbrella industry in general.
When Peter became aware of the latest capsize-at-launch of the Turkish-built yacht, Dolce Vento, he called me because he saw such strong parallels between the two incidents, and he thought it could benefit readers to see how the two cases compare to one another. Consequently, he wanted permission to reprint the original article on the yacht Báden which, of course, I gave him.
To read the reprint of my original article, use the button below:
After reading it, feel free to return here to FYBBO to make any comments or pose any questions you may have.
Fair winds and safe harbors. — Phil Friedman
Copyright © 2025 by Phil Friedman and the Port Royal Group
Phil
There are obvious limits to an Archimedes based quasi-static analysis when applied to 40M+ vessels that may have 45' bridge height and 7' draft, but I agree that such vessels are routinely safely launched after annual yard periods. Although they generally do not need the more complete analysis routinely used for aircraft, the replacement of knowledge in human brains by easily retrievable artificial knowledge should reduce some failures.